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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Five former National Hockey League ("NHL") players, 
David S. Forbes, Richard D. Middleton, D. Bradford Park, 
Ulf Nilsson, and Douglas D. Smail, have brought this RICO 
class action on behalf of all individuals who played NHL 
professional hockey during the time in which defendant R. 
Alan Eagleson served as executive director of the National 
Hockey League Players' Association ("NHLPA"). The 
complaint, as amended, alleges that Eagleson committed a 
variety of wrongful acts during his two-plus decades as 
head of the NHLPA which led to his criminal prosecution 
and conviction based on his pleas of guilty in both the 
United States and Canada. Count I of the complaint alleges 
that the NHL, its member teams, its president, John 
Ziegler, and the chairman of its board of governors, William 
Wirtz (collectively, the "NHL defendants"), conspired to bribe 
Eagleson to sell out the players' interests in collective 
bargaining. Count II of the complaint alleges that Eagleson 
and certain companies with which he was affiliated 
conspired to pilfer NHLPA funds over the course of many 
years. The principal issue on this appeal is whether the 
district court correctly granted Eagleson and the NHL 
defendants summary judgment on Count I on statute of 
limitations grounds. While Count II remains pending before 
the district court, and thus is not at issue on appeal, we 
nevertheless have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, as 
the district court properly certified its summary judgment 
as final on Count I pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
 
The district court set forth the relevant background 
relating to Count I in its published opinion: 
 
        Defendant R. Alan Eagleson was executive director of 
       the NHLPA, the exclusive bargaining unit of NHL 
       players, from the union's inception in 1967 until the 
       end of 1991. Essentially singlehandedly, he operated 
       the union's daily business and conducted the players' 
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       collective bargaining negotiations with the NHL. He 
       also engaged in business for himself as an agent and 
       lawyer representing players and even management 
       personnel in their individual contract negotiations with 
       club owners. 
 
        Plaintiffs allege that from 1976 through 1991 the 
       NHL defendants gave Eagleson unsupervised control of 
       a joint NHL-NHLPA venture which participated in 
       international hockey tournaments. They also granted 
       permission for NHL players to participate in the extra- 
       NHL events, which would otherwise have been 
       prohibited by the players' contracts. The participation 
       of the best NHL players was essential to the success of 
       the tournaments. 
 
        As head of the joint venture and as chief negotiator 
       for the International Committee of Hockey Canada, a 
       non-profit organization which negotiated international 
       hockey events for Canada, Eagleson organized some 
       two dozen or more tournaments from 1976 to 1991, 
       including five Canada Cups and nearly annual World 
       Championships and Soviet Union team exhibition 
       tours. For each Canada Cup, Hockey Canada was to be 
       paid the first $600,000 of net tournament proceeds 
       after expenses and 15% of net revenues above $2 
       million. All other net revenues were to be split equally 
       between the NHL clubs and the NHLPA. The NHL 
       players earned little additional pay for playing in the 
       tournaments and were induced to participate on the 
       understanding that they would be benefitting their 
       pension fund. In fact, plaintiffs allege, with Eagleson's 
       assent the NHL defendants simply reduced their 
       contributions to the pension fund by however much 
       the players contributed through international hockey. 
 
        Eagleson allegedly used his control over international 
       hockey to enrich himself and his associates. He (1) 
       directed revenue from sales of television and rinkboard 
       advertising rights to himself and associates; (2) 
       appropriated air travel passes obtained from Air 
       Canada in exchange for advertising rights for his 
       personal use and that of family and associates; (3) 
       charged excessive rents for office space; and (4) 
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       obtained excessive reimbursement for the legal services 
       of his law firm and for the services and expenses of 
       employees of other of his private businesses who were 
       `lent' to the international hockey venture to coordinate 
       the tournaments. Many of these schemes reduced the 
       net proceeds to be divided between the NHLPA and the 
       NHL pursuant to their joint venture. 
 
        In addition, from 1977 to 1986 the NHL defendants 
       gave Eagleson the power to place the NHL's disability 
       insurance policies for the players. (He also controlled 
       the NHLPA's insurance funds.) Eagleson allegedly used 
       his control over the disability insurance funds to extort 
       personal benefits from insurance brokers and sham 
       legal fees from players seeking disability benefits. 
 
        The crux of plaintiffs' claim against the NHL 
       defendants is that they knew that Eagleson was using 
       his control of international hockey and NHL disability 
       insurance funds to enrich himself, but nonetheless 
       allowed him to continue to exercise these powers 
       unconstrained. This acquiescence, plaintiffs allege, 
       amounted to a pattern of violations of S 302 of the 
       Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 
       S 186. Violations of S 302 constitute predicate acts of 
       racketeering under [RICO] 18 U.S.C. S 1961(1)(C) 
       (defining as a `racketeering activity' any act indictable 
       under 29 U.S.C. S 186). 
 
        Section 302 prohibits employers, employer 
       associations, and their agents from paying money or 
       any other `thing of value' to employee representatives, 
       and prohibits employee representatives from accepting 
       any such payment. 29 U.S.C. S 186(a), (b). Plaintiffs 
       allege that the NHL defendants violated S 302(a) each 
       time they permitted NHL players to participate in an 
       international tournament, gave Eagleson unsupervised 
       control over a tournament and its revenues, failed to 
       hold Eagleson accountable for the revenues and/or 
       overlooked his financial improprieties, and allowed him 
       control over placement of the NHL's disability 
       insurance premiums. Concomitantly, Eagleson 
       allegedly violated S 302(b) every time he accepted 
       control of an international tournament or the purchase 
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       of disability insurance. Count I also alleges that 
       Eagleson committed predicate acts of mail fraud and 
       obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C.SS 1341, 
       1346, and 1512(b) in attempting to conceal his 
       wrongdoing. See 18 U.S.C. S 1961(1). In addition, 
       plaintiffs contend that Eagleson's predicate acts can be 
       imputed to the NHL defendants and vice versa because 
       they were co-conspirators. 
 
        In return for the NHL defendants' facilitation of and 
       acquiescence in his self-enriching schemes, Eagleson 
       allegedly betrayed the interests of the players in 
       collective bargaining. Without attempting to gain 
       concessions in return or marshal the players' collective 
       leverage, he agreed to the 1979 merger of the NHL and 
       World Hockey Association (WHA) [which allegedly 
       caused player salaries to drop by eliminating 
       competition from the WHA], lack of free agency, 
       supplemental drafts, equalization rules, and non- 
       disclosure of players' salaries; he acquiesced in the 
       removal of player representatives from the board of the 
       players' pension funds and in the owners' practice of 
       offsetting pension contributions by the amount the 
       players contributed via international hockey; and he 
       agreed to inadequate minimum salaries. As a result, 
       the players' compensation was substantially 
       suppressed from what it would have been had they 
       been represented by an un-compromised and 
       aggressive union negotiator. 
 
        Eagleson negotiated collective bargains between the 
       NHL and the NHLPA signed in 1976, 1981, 1984, and 
       1988. The last Eagleson-negotiated collective bargain 
       expired in September 1991 and Eagleson's employment 
       with the NHLPA terminated in December 1991. 
 
Forbes v. Eagleson, 19 F. Supp.2d 352, 359-60 (E.D. Pa. 
1998) (footnotes and citations omitted except that footnote 
10 is in the quoted text). 
 
Plaintiffs filed this action on November 7, 1995, and later 
amended their complaint several times. Eagleson and the 
NHL defendants moved to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for 
a summary judgment on the ground that the four-year 
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statute of limitations applicable to civil RICO claims barred 
Count I of the fourth amended complaint. The district court 
treated the motion as being for summary judgment and 
granted the motion in an opinion and order dated August 
27, 1998. The court held that plaintiffs' claim with respect 
to injuries incurred before November 7, 1991 (four years 
prior to the filing of the action) was time-barred, and 
further held that plaintiffs failed to state a claim with 
respect to alleged "new and independent" injuries incurred 
on or after November 7, 1991. See id. at 378. 
 
Relying on our then extant case law, the district court 
held that a civil RICO cause of action accrues for 
limitations purposes when a plaintiff "knew or should have 
known that the elements of a civil RICO cause of action 
existed." Id. at 357 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). In the court's words, "plaintiffs' claims accrued 
and the statute of limitations began to run when they 
discovered or should have discovered that defendants had 
possibly engaged in conduct constituting the alleged 
pattern of racketeering and that this conduct had possibly 
caused them injury." Id. Within this formulation plaintiffs 
argued that they did not possess sufficient verifiable 
information to plead their Count I claim until 1994 when a 
federal grand jury indicted Eagleson for racketeering, 
embezzlement from a labor union, receipt of kickbacks 
affecting an employee welfare benefit plan, mail fraud, and 
obstruction of justice. Id. at 361. Defendants, by contrast, 
argued that plaintiffs had or should have had sufficient 
knowledge of the circumstances asserted in their Count I 
claim to bring this action by September 1991 at the latest, 
based on four sets of documents: (1) a 1984 Sports 
Illustrated article discussing allegations of wrongdoing by 
Eagleson; (2) a 1989 report on Eagleson's leadership of the 
union drafted by an attorney, Edward R. Garvey, on behalf 
of a large number of NHL players; (3) a June 1991 
complaint brought by two NHL players before the Alberta 
Labour Relations Board alleging collusion between Eagleson 
and the owners during collective bargaining; and (4) a 
series of investigative articles about Eagleson published by 
The Eagle-Tribune of Lawrence, Massachusetts, in 
September 1991. Id. at 360-61. The district court, agreed 
with defendants, indicating as follows: 
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       Even the most cursory of perusals of any one of these 
       . . . publications would have revealed to plaintiffs the 
       gist of their claim: Eagleson was enriching himself by 
       means of international hockey and the disability 
       insurance and the NHL defendants knew so but 
       apparently took no action to remove those 
       opportunities from him. Moreover, examination of 
       either the Sports Illustrated or The Eagle-Tribune 
       article[s] would have revealed almost every detail of the 
       schemes plaintiffs now allege in their complaint, as 
       well as sources to whom they could have gone for 
       verification or further information. From them, 
       plaintiffs learned or should have learned the following 
       facts (as discussed below, plaintiffs contest in any 
       significant way only their notice of the third fact listed 
       below): 
 
        1. Eagleson controlled international hockey on  behalf 
       of the NHL-NHLPA joint venture and Hockey Canada. 
       He controlled the organization, administration, 
       expenses, and revenues of the tournaments. 
 
        2. Eagleson was indisputably benefitting him self and 
       his associates from international hockey. For example, 
       Eagleson admitted that he lent his employees to 
       international hockey at higher rates than he paid them 
       and pocketed the difference, and that he gave control 
       of the sale of advertising rights to businesses headed 
       by his close associate and client, Arthur Harnett. 
 
        3. Eagleson was possibly benefitting himself  and his 
       associates from international hockey in other ways he 
       did not admit. For example, he might have controlled 
       the Harnett companies to whom he gave tournament 
       advertising rights and directly benefitted from their 
       sales, and he might have subsidized his private 
       businesses' office expenses by charging excessive 
       amounts to international hockey just as he subsidized 
       the salaries of his employees. 
 
        4. Eagleson's control over international hocke y and 
       its finances was not possible without the assent of the 
       NHL defendants, who agreed to permit their players to 
       play in the tournaments and agreed to Eagleson's 
       leadership of the NHL-NHLPA partnership. 
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        5. The NHL defendants knew or should have know n, 
       if only from the same public allegations of which 
       plaintiffs were aware, of charges that Eagleson's control 
       over international hockey was a conflict of interest and, 
       more specifically, that Eagleson was enriching himself 
       and his associates by means of international hockey. 
       They nonetheless continued to permit their players to 
       play in the tournaments and to allow Eagleson to run 
       them without making any apparent move to police or 
       otherwise constrain Eagleson's conduct. 
 
        6. Eagleson may have extorted personal benefits 
       from brokers for placing disability insurance with them 
       and may have charged players illegitimate fees for 
       helping them get paid off on their union and NHL 
       policies. 
 
        7. The NHL and Member Clubs allowed Eagleson t o 
       place their insurance funds despite notice of charges 
       that he had leveraged this power for his personal 
       benefit. 
 
        These facts were more than sufficient to provide 
       plaintiffs with notice that the NHL defendants might be 
       turning a blind eye to Eagleson's use of international 
       hockey and NHL disability insurance funds to enrich 
       himself, and thus with notice of a claim that both the 
       NHL defendants and Eagleson were continuously 
       violating S 302 of LMRA. Indeed, on the basis of these 
       facts plaintiffs could have actually [pled] almost every 
       allegation in their complaint concerning defendants' 
       alleged S 302 violations. That they may not have 
       recognized that these facts added up to unlawful bribes 
       is irrelevant. 
 
        Plaintiffs also knew or should have known of their 
       alleged injuries. Each of the inadequacies in the 
       Eagleson-negotiated collective bargaining agreements 
       alleged in plaintiffs' complaint . . . [was] detailed in the 
       Garvey report and most were also discussed in the 
       Sports Illustrated and The Eagle-Tribune articles. 
       Plaintiffs cannot seriously argue that players were 
       unaware of their injuries as alleged in this action. 
 
       . . . . 
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        To summarize, I find (1) it is undisputed and 
       indisputable that plaintiffs had inquiry notice of their 
       claim by 1990 at the latest; (2) in the exercise of 
       reasonable diligence plaintiffs should at the very least 
       have inquired into the specific factual allegations in the 
       Garvey and Sports Illustrated reports; (3) these reports, 
       as well as The Eagle-Tribune articles . . . provided 
       notice to plaintiffs by October 1991 at the latest of 
       more than sufficient facts to show the existence of their 
       claim that the NHL defendants and Eagleson had 
       engaged in a pattern of S 302 violations resulting in 
       inadequate representation and bad deals for the 
       players; and (4) no reasonable jury could find that 
       plaintiffs were mislead as to their cause of action so as 
       to toll the statute of limitations. Accordingly, I conclude 
       that plaintiffs' claims [as] to injuries incurred prior to 
       November 7, 1991 are barred as untimely. 
 
Id. at 370-72, 377 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
 
Following entry of the August 27, 1998 order, the district 
court granted plaintiffs leave to file a fifth amended 
complaint to plead a valid claim for new and independent 
injuries incurred after November 7, 1991. See Forbes v. 
Eagleson, No. CIV. A. 95-7021, 1999 WL 712571, at *1 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1999). After defendants moved for 
dismissal or summary judgment with respect to Count I of 
the fifth amended complaint, the district court granted 
summary judgment in their favor on September 10, 1999. 
See id. at *5. The district court then on October 14, 1999, 
entered its Rule 54(b) order following which plaintiffs 
appealed. 
 
The questions presented on this appeal are (1) as we have 
indicated, whether the district court erred in holding that 
plaintiffs' Count I claim for injuries incurred prior to 
November 7, 1991, is time-barred, and (2) whether the 
district court erred in dismissing the Count I claim in the 
fifth amended complaint for injuries incurred after 
November 7, 1991. We, however, will not address the 
district court's order granting summary judgment on the 
claim for injuries incurred after November 7, 1991, as we 
are satisfied that the court reached the correct result on 
that disposition, including its limitation on discovery, and 
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that an opinion on the point would not have precedential 
value. Thus, we focus on the first question which requires 
us to determine when plaintiffs were on actual or 
constructive knowledge of their Count I claim. To that end, 
we review the four sets of documents upon which the 
district court relied in making its ruling on the timeliness 
issue as they are no less important to our result than they 
were to the result the district court reached. 
 
The 1984 Sports Illustrated article 
 
The July 1984 Sports Illustrated article made the 
following principal assertions regarding the conduct of 
Eagleson, the NHL and the NHLPA: 
 
        1. In his capacity as executive director of the 
       NHLPA, Eagleson abused his positions as chief 
       negotiator for Hockey Canada and as personal 
       representative of many NHL players for his own gain 
       and for the benefit of his friends. 
 
        2. Eagleson had numerous conflicts of interest in 
       his capacities as executive director of the NHLPA, chief 
       negotiator for Hockey Canada, and player 
       representative. 
 
        3. Eagleson engaged in acts of self-dealing and 
       assessed improper fees in connection with his 
       administration of international hockey and player 
       disability funds. 
 
        4. Eagleson may have failed properly to represent 
       NHL players in collective bargaining between the NHL 
       and the NHLPA as a result of his conflicts of interest. 
 
        5. Eagleson improperly diverted international 
       hockey funds to his private businesses and may have 
       used such funds improperly to cover his private 
       business expenses.1 
 
The 1989 Garvey report 
 
The district court described the Garvey report and the 
events which precipitated it as follows: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court described and quoted the Sports Illustrated article 
at 
great length. See Forbes, 19 F. Supp.2d at 361-62. 
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       Beginning in late 1988, plaintiffs allege, agents of some 
       hockey players began seeking information about the 
       finances of international hockey tournaments. In 
       November 1988, they `issued a "Position Paper" to the 
       public in which, inter alia, they questioned Eagleson's 
       conflicts as union leader and player agent as well as 
       his role in international hockey,' contended that it was 
       his fiduciary duty to disclose information on the 
       tournaments' finances, and asserted that `[a]udited 
       information should have been prepared regarding all 
       monies received by Mr. Eagleson directly, or indirectly, 
       in relation to his efforts in organizing the international 
       hockey events.' About the same time, Ed Garvey, one of 
       plaintiffs' counsel in this action, began an investigation 
       of Eagleson and the union's affairs at the request of a 
       `substantial number of members of the plaintiff class.' 
       Garvey and other investigators unsuccessfully sought 
       financial information about international hockey and 
       the union from Eagleson, the union, the NHL, Hockey 
       Canada, and the Canadian government. 
 
Forbes, 19 F. Supp.2d at 363. 
 
The Garvey report made numerous allegations regarding 
Eagleson. In addition to citing the 1984 Sports Illustrated 
article and recommending it for reading to all players, the 
Garvey Report cited instances of self-dealing and improper 
player representation against Eagleson. Moreover, it noted 
inadequacies in collective bargaining agreements and 
multiple bargaining concessions affecting NHL players 
attributable to Eagleson's compromised position. The report 
also criticized Eagleson for withholding information 
regarding international hockey, the NHL, the players' union 
and the pension fund, including information required to be 
disclosed by law. 
 
Comments in the Garvey report indicated that its author 
suspected that Eagleson was selling out the players in 
exchange for the ability to draw profits from international 
tournaments. The report stated that "[t]he conflicts of 
interest [involving Eagleson] are shocking, but even more 
shocking is a pattern of sweetheart agreements with the 
NHL over all these years. It may sound harsh, but he has 
not pursued player interests at critical times in your history 
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as a union." App. at 109. The report stated as follows with 
regard to Eagleson's financial take from international 
hockey: 
 
       The $25,000 Alan [Eagleson] received from the NHLPA 
       [as a bonus for organizing international tournaments] 
       may be the tip of the iceberg. We have asked Hockey 
       Canada to tell us how much money goes to Alan, his 
       law firm, holding companies he controls, family 
       members or other legal entities. The result of our 
       investigation is a big goose egg. The Hockey Canada 
       spokesman, Ron Robinson told me: `We cannot tell you 
       how much money went to Eagleson without Alan's 
       permission, but he has the information if he wants to 
       share it with you . . . .' 
 
       . . . . 
 
        And, the man with the information, Alan Eagleson, 
       won't give us an answer. While he has always 
       maintained that he `doesn't take a dime from 
       international hockey', former employees dispute that 
       and now he admits that Hockey Canada pays some 
       `overhead'. How much overhead? He won't say. Does he 
       get money from promoting Intl. [sic] Hockey; from rink- 
       board advertising as one player assured us he does? 
 
App. at 118-19 (emphasis added). The report further stated: 
 
       [Eagleson] is a different person when he negotiates for 
       you against his friends Wirtz and Ziegler [as compared 
       to when he negotiates his own contract with the 
       NHLPA]. Our tiger becomes a pussycat. No research, no 
       preparations, no surprise attacks, no strike threats, no 
       goals. As one G.M. put it [as quoted in the Sports 
       Illustrated article]: `Al delivers us the players and we 
       give him international hockey. It's that simple.' A quid 
       pro quo. It is no wonder the League put him in the 
       Hockey Hall of Fame . . . . 
 
       . . . . 
 
        . . . Harold Ballard called the 1982 collective 
       bargaining agreement `a joke on the players'. Alan 
       [Eagleson] wants to head international hockey. He can 
       only do so if the NHL owners and Ziegler agree. 
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       Therefore, he must not do things at the bargaining 
       table to antagonize them too much or they will dump 
       him--simple as that. Again, Trottier's agent commented 
       on Alan's conflict: `They can take international hockey 
       away from Alan so they have him where they want and 
       that isn't right.' 
 
App. at 121-22, 155 (emphasis in original).2 
 
The 1991 Alberta Labour Relations Board petition  
 
In June 1991, agent Rich Winter--whose name is listed 
along with Garvey's on the 1989 report--filed a petition 
with the Alberta Labour Relations Board on behalf of two 
NHL players seeking to void the 1988 CBA on the grounds 
of collusion between Eagleson and the owners. See Forbes, 
19 F. Supp.2d at 365. The petition alleged that there was 
an "arrangement between the NHL and Eagleson pursuant 
to which Eagleson delivers the players to the NHL under 
the terms of a Collective Agreement more advantageous to 
the NHL than it would have been had Eagleson negotiated 
for the NHLPA in good faith in exchange for which the NHL 
granted Eagleson the permission he needs to run 
international hockey." App. at 608. The petition further 
alleged as follows: 
 
       Eagleson, his family, and various firms or corporations 
       in which he or his family have an interest, had a 
       financial interest in the organization of each of 
       Canada's entries assembled by Eagleson for the World 
       Ice Hockey Championships and the Canada Cup 
       tournaments organized by Eagleson. Eagleson, his 
       family, and various firms or corporations in which he 
       or his family have an interest, received the following in 
       exchange for Eagleson's involvement in organizing 
       these events: 
 
       a. fees; 
 
       b. profits from the sale of television and other rights 
       for the events initially acquired by Eagleson, his 
       family, or said firms or corporations, at less than fair 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The district court described the Garvey Report at greath length. See 
Forbes, 19 F. Supp.2d at 363-64. 
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       market value through Eagleson's efforts in breach of 
       Eagleson's fiduciary duties to the NHLPA; 
 
       c. free travel and accommodation vouchers; 
 
       d. indirect payments received from firms or 
       corporations owned by Arthur Harnett, [insurance 
       broker] Robert Bradshaw, or Harold Ballard but 
       operated and controlled by Eagleson; 
 
       e. reimbursement of overhead expenses, some of 
       which had previously been reimbursed by the 
       NHLPA; and 
 
       f. payment or reimbursement of the salaries of 
       individuals employed by Eagleson, his family or said 
       firms or corporations for services other than services 
       rendered in respect of the events from which 
       Eagleson arranged for reimbursement. 
 
       The [petitioners] estimate the total profits received by 
       Eagleson, his family or firms or corporations in which 
       they have an interest, to be in the millions of dollars. 
 
       . . . . 
 
        To assure himself of the NHL's support for his 
       assembling Canada's team at the World Ice Hockey 
       Championships and the Canada Cups, Eagleson agreed 
       with the NHL to use his influence to cause the NHLPA 
       to negotiate for less than it could have achieved in 
       collective bargaining conducted in good faith without 
       such influence . . . . 
 
App. at 611-12. 
 
The petition eventually was dropped on the basis of an 
agreement of the parties. App. at 645. 
 
The 1991 Eagle-Tribune articles 
 
In September 1991, The Eagle-Tribune of Lawrence, 
Massachusetts, published a series of articles on the subject 
of "[i]ntrigue and conflict in the world of big-time hockey." 
App. at 646-78. These articles discussed the Sports 
Illustrated article, the Garvey report, and the Alberta 
Labour Relations Board petition and their contents. The 
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articles in The Eagle-Tribune, however, listed several "major 
findings," including the following: 
 
       The head of the players' union, Eagleson, has 
       repeatedly placed himself in a position of conflict of 
       interest between players and team owners, and 
       between union and personal business. Some players 
       and other agents charge the players have wound up 
       the losers. Meanwhile, they contend, Eagleson has won 
       the favor of the league and team owners and advanced 
       his own career, becoming perhaps the most powerful 
       man in hockey. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       Eagleson became Canada's international hockey czar 
       by obtaining the blessing of NHL owners, with whom 
       he has bargained on behalf of the players. Eagleson 
       also has close ties with NHL executives and some 
       individual owners, but maintains he has been able to 
       remain a tough negotiator for the players. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       Hockey players, who face the most restrictive free agent 
       rules in North American professional sports, may have 
       lost a major chance to win free agency when they 
       consented to a 1979 merger between the NHL and the 
       rival World Hockey Association (WHA). As a result, 
       according to one study, hockey salaries have slumped 
       in relation to salaries in the three other major sports. 
 
App. at 646-47. Citing the Sports Illustrated  article, The 
Eagle-Tribune indicated that, because Eagleson needed NHL 
approval to use NHL players in international tournaments, 
"[c]ritics say that makes Eagleson beholden to the same 
people he has bargained with on behalf of the players." 
App. at 655. 
 
The 1994 indictment 
 
In March 1994, a grand jury in the District of 
Massachusetts indicted Eagleson on 32 counts of 
racketeering, mail fraud, embezzlement of labor 
organization assets, witness tampering, and accepting 
kickbacks affecting an employee welfare benefit plan. App. 
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at 296. The indictment included specific allegations that, 
over a period of many years, Eagleson obtained improper 
personal profits from international tournaments and from 
his position of control over the players' disability insurance 
program. The indictment included the following allegations, 
among others: 
 
       Eagleson stole profits from the sale of rinkboard 
       advertising for various international tournaments-- 
       profits which properly belonged to the NHLPA, the 
       NHL, and Hockey Canada. These profits included air 
       travel passes tendered by Air Canada as payment for 
       rinkboard advertising space. Eagleson kept these 
       passes for his personal use and for the use of his 
       family and associates. Eagleson also provided Air 
       Canada with tickets to Canada Cup games in return 
       for air passes which he converted to his own use. The 
       indictment also alleged that Eagleson transferred 
       advertising rights for the 1991 Canada Cup 
       tournament to a company, All Canada Sports 
       Promotions, Ltd. which was controlled by one of 
       Eagleson's business associates, Irving Ungerman, and 
       that All Canada Sports Promotions, Ltd. resold the 
       rights and paid Eagleson a portion of its profit. The 
       indictment further charged that Eagleson's "interest in 
       and involvement with rinkboard advertising sales at 
       international hockey tournaments, and his 
       arrangement with Air Canada, and income and value 
       derived therefrom, was hidden and undisclosed to the 
       members of the NHLPA," and it alleged that Eagleson 
       made "false and fraudulent representations concerning 
       his activities associated with the Canada Cup 
       tournaments and other international hockey events." 
       App. at 319. 
 
       Eagleson received kickbacks from insurance brokers in 
       exchange for placing the NHLPA's insurance business 
       with those brokers. These kickbacks included cash 
       payments and insurance for Eagleson and his family at 
       little or no cost. 
 
       Eagleson falsely represented to NHLPA members that 
       neither he nor his family had received any money from 
       international hockey events. 
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       Eagleson, acting as chief negotiator for Hockey Canada, 
       "paid unnecessary, inappropriate and excessive 
       salaries and incurred other unnecessary and 
       inappropriate expenses on behalf of Hockey Canada, 
       including monies paid to members of Eagleson's family, 
       business associates of Eagleson, and companies with 
       which Eagleson was associated." App. at 314-15. 
 
       Eagleson "falsely represented to [NHLPA] members that 
       . . . NHLPA expense records were properly kept, and 
       that an `independent audit' of NHLPA records found no 
       improper benefits or practices." App. at 331. 
 
       Eagleson made false representations to two injured 
       players, Glen Sharpley and Bob Dailey, in the course of 
       charging them improper fees for Eagleson's assistance 
       in collecting on their disability claims. When members 
       of the NHLPA raised concerns about Eagleson's 
       behavior toward these two players, Eagleson falsely 
       represented to NHLPA members that Sharpley's claim 
       was a "difficult case" requiring the assistance of 
       outside counsel. Eagleson did not disclose that 
       Eagleson himself was the outside counsel whose 
       assistance Sharpley paid for. App. at 346. 
 
According to an affidavit from an Assistant U.S. Attorney, 
the indictment resulted from a "lengthy and 
comprehensive" investigation which produced information 
and evidence "much of which was not and is not publicly 
available." App. at 283-84.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Eagleson eventually pled guilty in January 1998 to an information 
alleging three counts of mail fraud. Count One alleged that Eagleson 
sent a letter to NHLPA members in 1989 falsely representing that neither 
he, nor his family or any company with which he was associated, ever 
had received any money directly or indirectly from international hockey 
events. Count Two alleged that Eagleson fraudulently converted NHLPA 
funds to his personal benefit by causing the NHLPA to incur expenses 
for clothing, theater tickets, and other goods and services. Eagleson sent 
a letter to NHLPA members in 1989 falsely representing that no such 
improper expenditures had occurred. Count Three alleged mail fraud 
based on a 1989 letter from Eagleson to members of the NHLPA which 
made false representations regarding Eagleson's involvement in the 
handling of Glen Sharpley's disability claim. App. at 183-96, 370-75. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Accrual of Plaintiffs' Claim 
 
The first question we address is when plaintiffs' Count I 
claim accrued. While RICO does not include a limitations 
period for civil claims, the Supreme Court held in Agency 
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 156, 
107 S.Ct. 2759, 2767 (1987), that the four-year limitations 
period in civil antitrust actions seeking treble damages 
under the Clayton Act is applicable to RICO actions. 4 See 
also Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 183, 117 S.Ct. 
1984, 1987 (1997). That conclusion, however, did not 
establish when a RICO claim accrues, i.e., when the four- 
year term starts running. Following the Supreme Court's 
decision in Malley-Duff, we established our accrual rule in 
Keystone Insurance Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 
1988), as follows: 
 
       The rule which we announce provides that the 
       limitations period for a civil RICO claim runs from the 
       date the plaintiff knew or should have known that the 
       elements of a civil RICO cause of action existed, unless, 
       as a part of the same pattern of racketeering activity, 
       there is further injury to the plaintiff or further 
       predicate acts occur which are part of the same 
       pattern. In that case, the accrual period shall run from 
       the time when the plaintiff knew or should have known 
       of the last injury or the last predicate act which is part 
       of the same pattern of racketeering activity. The last 
       predicate act need not have resulted in injury to the 
       plaintiff but must be part of the same `pattern.' 
 
Id. at 1126. 
 
However, due to two Supreme Court opinions, the rule 
governing the accrual of civil RICO claims has changed 
several times in recent years and thus Keystone  does not 
remain the law. First, in Klehr the Court specifically 
rejected the "last predicate act" portion of our rule in 
Keystone on the ground that it "creates a limitations period 
that is longer than Congress could have contemplated." See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We are exercising plenary review on this appeal. See Nelson v. Upsala 
College, 51 F.3d 383, 385 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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521 U.S. at 187, 117 S.Ct. at 1989. The Court noted that 
other courts of appeals had adopted one of two accrual 
rules for RICO claims: (1) an "injury and pattern discovery" 
rule, under which a RICO claim accrues when the plaintiff 
discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, both the 
existence and source of his injury and that the injury is 
part of a pattern of racketeering activity, and (2) an "injury 
discovery" rule, under which a RICO claim accrues when 
the plaintiff simply discovers or should have discovered his 
injury. See id. at 185, 117 S.Ct. at 1988-89; Annulli v. 
Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 195 (3d Cir. 1999). The Court 
declined to resolve this conflict, however, choosing instead 
to leave the matter for another day as the statute of 
limitations barred the action before it under either 
formulation. See id. at 191-93, 117 S.Ct. at 1991-92. 
 
In the wake of Klehr, we chose to follow the"injury and 
pattern discovery" rule; in effect, we adhered to the 
Keystone rule minus the "last predicate act" exception 
which the Supreme Court had rejected in Klehr . See 
Annulli, 200 F.3d at 192, 195; see also Rolo v. City 
Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 656 (3d Cir. 
1998). Thus, under Annulli, "a civil RICO claim accrues and 
the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff 
knew or should have known that each element of a civil 
RICO claim existed--namely, that he was injured, that the 
defendant was the source of this injury, and that a pattern 
of activity prohibited by RICO caused this harm." Annulli, 
200 F.3d at 195. The district court applied the"injury and 
pattern discovery" rule in this case. See Forbes, 19 F. 
Supp.2d at 356-57. 
 
Earlier this year, however, the Supreme Court rejected 
the "injury and pattern discovery" rule. See Rotella v. Wood, 
120 S.Ct. 1075, 1078-80 (2000). In its place, the Court 
contemplated that it eventually would adopt one of two 
accrual rules: (1) an injury discovery rule, or (2) an "injury 
occurrence rule" under which knowledge of injury would be 
irrelevant. The Court, however, again left the matter 
unsettled, as it decided that at that time it would not 
choose between the rules. See id. at 1080 n.2. 
 
Thus, once again we must make a decision regarding 
when a RICO action accrues even though we are aware that 
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the Supreme Court ultimately may accept or reject our 
choice. After careful consideration, we will adopt an injury 
discovery rule rather than an injury occurrence rule. We do 
so for what seems to us to be the sound reason that the 
injury discovery rule is in harmony with the general notion 
that a discovery rule applies whenever a federal statute of 
limitation is silent on the issue.5 Under the injury discovery 
rule, we must determine when the plaintiffs knew or should 
have known of their injury. Thus, we alter the judicial 
landscape unfavorably to the plaintiffs from the shape in 
which it existed when this case was before the district court 
and consider the case under an accrual rule more adverse 
to plaintiffs than that the district court applied. 
 
We, of course, start with the complaint. Count I of 
plaintiffs' fourth amended complaint describes the alleged 
injury as follows: 
 
       64. The object and purpose of the racketeering act ivity 
       . . . was to cause Eagleson . . . and the NHLPA to come 
       under the influence and control of the NHL, the 
       Member Clubs, Ziegler, and Wirtz, and to fail to 
       aggressively represent the interests of the NHLPA 
       players by granting unreasonable concessions to and 
       failing to seek benefits from the NHL and the Member 
       Clubs during the period from the mid-1970's through 
       at least the end of 1991 . . . . The further object and 
       purpose was to enable the Member Clubs to pay far 
       less in compensation to the NHLPA players then they 
       would otherwise have paid, thereby unjustly enriching 
       themselves at the players' expense. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       72. As a direct and proximate result of the conduc t of 
       defendants described above, the plaintiffs and each 
       member of the plaintiff class have been injured in their 
       business or property, as provided, in 18 U.S.C. 
       S 1964(c), including, but not limited to, losses of 
       hundreds of thousands of dollars, each, in salary and 
       other benefits which they would have earned as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The parties do not dispute that Rotella  applies retroactively to this 
case. 
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       employees of the Member Clubs but for the illegal 
       activity set forth above. 
 
App. at 67-68. 
 
On the record before us, it is clear as a matter of law that 
plaintiffs were aware, or should have been aware, of the 
injuries they alleged at least as early as 1989. The Garvey 
report, issued to NHLPA members that year, argued 
extensively that NHL players were receiving reduced salary 
and benefits as a result of Eagleson's failure to engage in 
vigorous collective bargaining. The report stated that "[n]o 
benefits of any significance have been achieved in the entire 
decade of the 80's through collective bargaining" and 
charged that "the [NHLPA] has gone backward while sports 
unions in all other sports have made major gains." The 
report presented statistics to show that NHL players are 
"last [in professional sports] in salaries, benefits, percentage 
of gross, and in information." App. at 106. The report 
argued that Eagleson's failure to bargain vigorously against 
the NHL owners was the reason for the players' poor 
situation: 
 
       Frankly, if any other union leader did what Alan 
       Eagleson has done over the past 22 years, the news 
       media would be screaming for an investigation. The 
       conflicts of interest are shocking, but even more 
       shocking is a pattern of sweetheart agreements with 
       the NHL over all these years. It may sound harsh, but 
       he has not pursued player interests at critical times in 
       your history as a union. There is a legitimate question 
       whether there is, in fact, a `players' association. For the 
       most part, it seems that Alan runs the Association as 
       his private preserve . . . . 
 
       . . . . 
 
        Last on the list [of professional sports with respect to 
       such matters as free agency, impartial arbitration, and 
       players' percentage of gross revenues] is the NHL. Last 
       because the Players Association under Alan Eagleson 
       has never been prepared for bargaining. We don't know 
       how tough the NHL is at the bargaining table because 
       they have never been tested. Never a serious law suit 
       filed against the league to obtain free agency, and, 
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       when they had it handed to them on a plate with the 
       proposed WHA-NHL merger, Eagleson gave away player 
       freedom without a whimper. 
 
       . . . . 
 
        Alan Eagleson is a brilliant attorney and politician. 
       He admits that John Ziegler is one of his best friends 
       and Bill Wirtz, who lives near him in Florida, is an 
       extremely close friend despite the fact that Wirtz is the 
       chief negotiator for the NHL. Given his brilliance, there 
       is really no excuse for the lack of preparation for 
       bargaining except one--he does not take bargaining 
       seriously because he is comfortable with the cozy 
       relationship that has been so good for him . . . . 
 
       . . . . 
 
        Alan Eagleson has been a vital part of the NHL 
       establishment. He has contributed greatly [through his 
       failure to bargain aggressively with the owners] to 
       keeping salaries down, profits up. He has helped 
       maintain [the NHL's] monopoly status, he keeps 
       players tied up [by failing to bargain for free agency], 
       he allows the League to control through non-impartial 
       arbitration; he eliminates freedom whenever it raises 
       its ugly head; and he keeps you in the dark on the 
       economics of the League while singing management's 
       song about the `fragile' NHL. 
 
App. at 109, 110, 112, 145 (emphases in original). 
 
We have no doubt that by 1989 (and probably earlier), 
NHL players were aware that they did not enjoy similar 
salaries, free agency rights, or other advantages available to 
players in other professional sports. Furthermore, we do 
not understand how anyone who has considered the Garvey 
report--which was commissioned at the behest of some 200 
NHL players--can doubt that it should have led the players 
to believe that their situation was largely a result of the 
"cozy" collective bargaining relationship between Eagleson 
on the one hand and Ziegler, Wirtz, and the owners on the 
other. Thus, by 1989 at the latest, plaintiffs were aware, or 
should have been aware, of the injury which they allege in 
Count I (reduced salary and benefits) and the source of the 
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injury (the improper bargaining behavior by Eagleson). 
Under an injury discovery rule, nothing more was required 
to trigger the running of the four-year limitations period. 
See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 
1380, 1386 (3d Cir. 1994) (limitations period commences 
when "plaintiff has discovered or, by exercising reasonable 
diligence, should have discovered (1) that he or she has 
been injured, and (2) that this injury has been caused by 
another party's conduct"; "We have in the past stated that 
a claim accrues in a federal cause of action upon 
awareness of actual injury, not upon awareness that this 
injury constitutes a legal wrong").6  
 
Indeed, possibly aware that clearly their Count I claim 
accrued prior to November 7, 1991, the plaintiffs argue that 
--regardless of their awareness of the alleged injury--the 
statute of limitations was tolled until 1994 (when Eagleson 
was indicted) because defendants' acts of fraudulent 
concealment prevented them from learning facts essential 
to pleading the predicate acts of bribery underlying their 
Count I claim. Thus, we now turn to the issue of fraudulent 
concealment. 
 
B. Fraudulent Concealment 
 
In Rotella, the Supreme Court stated that,"[i]n rejecting 
pattern discovery as a basic rule, we do not unsettle the 
understanding that federal statutes of limitations are 
generally subject to equitable principles of tolling, and 
where a pattern remains obscure in the face of a plaintiff 's 
diligence in seeking to identify it, equitable tolling may be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Plaintiffs contend that the district court made errors with respect to 
its allocation of the burden of proof. If we were reviewing a judgment 
entered by the district court predicated on findings made at a nonjury 
trial we would be obliged to consider these contentions but inasmuch as 
we are exercising plenary review of a summary judgment, we have no 
need to make an analysis of the district court's allocation of the burden 
of proof. After all, we are applying the law ourselves to the historical 
facts and, even though we reach the same result as did the district 
court, we make our determinations on the basis of the law as we find it 
to be for the reasons we have set forth. Thus, it does not matter whether 
the district court erred with respect to placing the burden of proof as we 
do not defer to its decision. 
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one answer to the plaintiff 's difficulty . . .." Rotella, 120 
S.Ct. at 1084 (citation omitted). Unlike the discovery rule, 
which determines the time of the initial commencement of 
a limitations period, "[e]quitable tolling functions to stop 
the statute of limitations from running where the claim's 
accrual date has already passed." Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1387. 
Among the circumstances warranting equitable tolling are 
situations where "the defendant has actively misled the 
plaintiff respecting the plaintiff 's cause of action," i.e. 
fraudulent concealment. Id. at 1387. "[W]here the plaintiff 
has been actively misled . . . the equitable tolling doctrine 
provides the plaintiff with the full statutory limitations 
period, starting from the date the facts supporting the 
plaintiff 's cause of action either become apparent to the 
plaintiff or should have become apparent to a person in the 
plaintiff 's position with a reasonably prudent regard for his 
or her rights." Id. at 1389. We have described the 
differences between the discovery rule inquiry and the 
equitable tolling inquiry as follows: 
 
       [T]he discovery rule and the equitable tolling doctrine 
       are similar in one respect and different in another. The 
       doctrines are similar in that each requires a level of 
       diligence on the part of the plaintiff; that is, each 
       requires the plaintiff to take reasonable measures to 
       uncover the existence of injury. The plaintiff who fails 
       to exercise this reasonable diligence may lose the 
       benefit of either doctrine. The two doctrines differ, 
       however, with respect to the type of knowledge or 
       cognizance that triggers their respective applications. 
       The discovery rule keys on a plaintiff 's cognizance, or 
       imputed cognizance, of actual injury. Equitable tolling, 
       on the other hand, keys on a plaintiff 's cognizance, or 
       imputed cognizance, of the facts supporting the 
       plaintiff 's cause of action. Underlying this difference 
       between the discovery rule and equitable tolling is the 
       more fundamental difference in purpose between the 
       two rules. The purpose of the discovery rule is to 
       determine the accrual date of a claim, for ultimate 
       purposes of determining, as a legal matter, when the 
       statute of limitations begins to run. Equitable tolling 
       . . . presumes claim accrual. Equitable tolling steps in 
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       to toll, or stop, the running of the statute of limitations 
       in light of established equitable considerations. 
 
Id. at 1390 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes 
omitted). 
 
We have indicated that the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving fraudulent concealment. See In re Lower Lake Erie 
Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1179 (3d Cir. 
1993). The plaintiff must show active misleading  by the 
defendant, see Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1391 n.10, and must 
further show that he exercised reasonable diligence in 
attempting to uncover the relevant facts. See id. at 1390; 
see also Klehr, 521 U.S. at 194, 117 S.Ct. at 1993 (in the 
civil RICO context, " `reasonable diligence' does matter, and 
a plaintiff who is not reasonably diligent may not assert 
`fraudulent concealment.' "). Further, the plaintiff must 
show that he actually was "mis[led] . . . into thinking that 
he d[id] not have a cause of action," Davis v. Grusemeyer, 
996 F.2d 617, 624 (3d Cir. 1993); in other words, the 
tolling lasts only "until the plaintiff knows, or should 
reasonably be expected to know, the concealed facts 
supporting the cause of action . . . ." Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 
1392. Thus, ordinarily when plaintiffs seek to demonstrate 
a case for equitable tolling, and defendants seek summary 
judgment on the issue, a court must determine (1) whether 
there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that 
defendants engaged in affirmative acts of concealment 
designed to mislead the plaintiffs regarding facts supporting 
their Count I claim, (2) whether there is sufficient evidence 
to support a finding that plaintiffs exercised reasonable 
diligence, and (3) whether there is sufficient evidence to 
support a finding that plaintiffs were not aware, nor should 
they have been aware, of the facts supporting their claim 
until a time within the limitations period measured 
backwards from when the plaintiffs filed their complaint. 
Absent evidence to support these findings there is no 
genuine dispute of material fact on the issue and the 
defendants are entitled to summary judgment. See 
Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., No. 99- 
3873, ___ F.3d ___, 2000 WL 1273953, at *8 (3d Cir. Sept. 
8, 2000). 
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We will assume without deciding that the defendants, 
particularly Eagleson, engaged in affirmative acts of 
concealment designed to mislead plaintiffs about a fact 
supporting their Count I claim--namely, the fact that 
Eagleson was profiting personally from his control over the 
international tournaments and the disability insurance 
program. We also will assume without deciding that the 
plaintiffs exercised reasonable diligence in an attempt to 
uncover the relevant facts. Nevertheless, we will affirm the 
order for summary judgment as the plaintiffs either knew 
or reasonably should have known the facts supporting their 
course of action well prior to four years before they brought 
this case on November 7, 1995. 
 
As the NHL defendants correctly indicate, the allegations 
in the Complaint against them appeared in the 1984 Sports 
Illustrated article and 1989 Garvey Report, and a virtual 
carbon copy of the complaint was filed with the Alberta 
Labour Relations Board before the limitations period 
expired. See app. at 601-44. Thus, the plaintiffs knew of 
sufficient facts to support their claim at least 6 years before 
they filed this case. In particular, they certainly knew of 
Eagleson's poor representation of them and that, with the 
cooperation of the NHL defendants, he was profiting from 
international hockey through use of the players' labors. 
Although it is true that Eagleson denied wrongdoing, 
nonetheless, his denials do not allow plaintiffs, who were 
aware of their potential claim, to allege ignorance. 
Moreover, inasmuch as civil RICO actions tend to arise in 
business situations in which the defendants will deny 
wrongdoing, an expansive application of tolling rules will 
create a limitations period beyond what Congress 
contemplated. See Klehr, 521 U.S. at 187, 117 S.Ct. at 
1989. 
 
We also point out that while the Supreme Court in 
Rotella indicated that "where a pattern remains obscure in 
the face of a plaintiff 's diligence in seeking to identify it, 
equitable tolling may be . . ." applicable, Rotella, 120 S.Ct. 
at 1084, there was nothing obscure about the actionable 
conduct here. The Garvey report said the "conflicts of 
interest are shocking" and "even more shocking is a pattern 
of sweetheart agreements." App. at 109. Furthermore, it 
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had been evident for many years that Eagleson used his 
position for personal illegitimate gain. 
 
We recognize that plaintiffs insist they lacked sufficient 
information until Forbes was indicted to plead their RICO 
claim consistently with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and, indeed, 
support this contention with their affidavits. But we are 
satisfied that plaintiffs' statements on this point do not 
create a genuine dispute of fact precluding the district 
court from granting summary judgment on the tolling issue 
as the unmistakable historical facts demonstrate that the 
plaintiffs were aware or should have been aware of the facts 
supporting their Count I claim long before November 7, 
1991. Thus, contrary to plaintiffs' position, we have no 
doubt that they and their attorneys could have signed a 
federal complaint consistently with Rule 11 prior to 
November 7, 1991.7 As the district court noted, plaintiffs 
"could have actually pled almost every allegation in their 
complaint concerning defendants alleged S 302 violations" 
based on the facts contained in the various publications 
available to them. Forbes, 19 F.3d at 372. Furthermore, the 
Garvey report which was available to them long before 
November 7, 1991, gave the plaintiffs an additional basis 
for the action. 
 
Although Rule 11 imposes a duty of reasonable inquiry 
as to the facts set forth in a pleading, Dura Systems, Inc. v. 
Rothbury Investments, Ltd., 886 F.2d 551, 556 (3d Cir. 
1989), "[i]t is not necessary that an investigation into the 
facts be carried to the point of absolute certainty." Kraemer 
v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686, 689 (7th Cir. 1990). We so 
held in Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 95 
(3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted), in which we overturned 
an award of sanctions under Rule 11 indicating, 
 
       At the time plaintiffs' counsel filed the [antitrust] 
       complaint here, he knew facts that supported a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Plaintiffs seem to contend that prior to its amendment in 1993 Rule 
11 placed a more stringent burden on a person signing a pleading than 
it did following the amendment and that we should consider the effect of 
Rule 11 as it existed prior to the amendment. We are satisfied, however, 
that Rule 11, either before or after 1993, was not an impediment to 
plaintiffs bringing this action long before they did so. 
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       reasonable suspicion of cooperation between 
       defendants and other parties who could have been 
       expected to benefit from the defendants' intransigence. 
       These factual circumstances and the rational 
       inferences that may be drawn from them convince us 
       that the allegations of the first count comported with 
       Rule 11's pre-filing investigation requirement. 
 
See also Morda v. Klein, 865 F.2d 782, 785-86 (6th Cir. 
1989) ("It would be particularly difficult to fault plaintiffs 
for a lack of prefiling inquiry when, as here, defendants 
have refused plaintiffs access to material information that 
would bear on certain allegations made in the complaint."). 
In this regard we point out that "[a] signer's obligation 
personally to comply with the requirements of Rule 11 
clearly does not preclude the signer from any reliance on 
information from other persons." Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, 
Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1994). It is inconceivable 
to us that if plaintiffs had brought this action in a timely 
fashion and had been unsuccessful that a court would have 
found that the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against 
them for having filed the complaint would have been 
appropriate.8 
 
Finally, we are not impressed with the plaintiffs' 
argument that they were justified in delaying bringing their 
action as the government, notwithstanding its resources, 
did not obtain an indictment until 1994 after it completed 
its investigation. After all, even though RICO is a criminal 
statute, surely civil RICO cases are brought in situations in 
which it is hardly conceivable that there could be a criminal 
indictment. See Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1302, 1310 
(3d Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Greenberg, J., dissenting). Thus, 
the mere fact that the government did not obtain an 
indictment before a time within plaintiffs' four-year statute 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We are not holding that merely because plaintiffs could have filed 
their 
complaint long before they did without violating Rule 11, that their 
failure to do so precludes tolling on a fraudulent concealment basis. 
Rather, we simply are holding that Rule 11 does not save plaintiffs' claim 
in the circumstances of this case. We do not determine whether there is 
a class of claims in which the statute of limitations is tolled even 
though 
the potential plaintiffs could have filed a complaint during the tolling 
period without violating Rule 11. 
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of limitations period does not mean that the statute of 
limitations in this case should be deemed equitably tolled 
until the return of the indictment. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons the orders for summary 
judgment entered August 27, 1998, and September 10, 
1999, as made final by order entered October 14, 1999, will 
be affirmed. 
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